Abstract. In terms of convenience requirements, mobile communications have become one of the most important roaming services for wireless environments. Especially, how to prevent unauthorized users from illegitimate accesses in mobile communication systems has become an important issue. Password authentication with smart card is one of the mechanisms that were widely used to authenticate the validity of participants between a roaming user, the foreign agent and the home agent of a roaming user. In 2011, Yoon et al. proposed a user friendly authentication scheme with user anonymity for wireless communications and claimed that their scheme is secure and efficient using for battery-powered mobile devices in mobile communication systems. However, we observe that Yoon et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to insider attack, unfairness in session key computation, unable to provide user anonymity and is not easily reparable. In this paper, we offer a more secure and efficient authentication scheme to remedy its security weaknesses and provide reliable roaming accesses in mobile communication environments.
Introduction
Nowadays, wireless communication systems and mobile computing environments have become more and more popular in multifarious aspects, from the personal to the home, offices, commerce, industry, military, community, public places and so on. Through seamless roaming technology, a roaming user can obtain desired services from the home agent by using his/her mobile devices within a range of wireless networks at anytime and anyplace. When a mobile user roams to a foreign network, it becomes necessary to provide secure communications and perform authentication with a foreign agent under the assistance of his/her home agent [1, 6-8, 10-14, 16-18] .
In order to ensure communication security and user privacy, many authentication scheme with roaming service and user anonymity for mobile communication environments have been proposed [3, 5, 8, 9, 11, 16, 17] . In 2004, Zhu and Ma [19] proposed a smart card based password authentication scheme with anonymity for roaming services. However, in 2006, Lee et al. showed that Zhu and Ma's scheme cannot resist forge attack and achieve mutual authentication [7] . Lee et al. further proposed an improved scheme to overcome the weaknesses of [19] . Unfortunately, in 2008, Wu et al. [16] pointed out security vulnerabilities of [7] and proposed their enhanced version of Lee et al.'s scheme. Later, Lee et al. [8] and He et al. [5] showed that [16] also failed to achieve user anonymity.
Recently, Yoon et al. propose a user friendly and anonymity authentication scheme using passwords and smart cards for wireless communications [17] . As mentioned in [17] , the following criteria are important for providing efficiency and security to suitable battery-powered mobile devices. Major design goals include:
(1) User friendly A mobile user can freely choose and change his/her passwords and does not need to maintain the password verification table.
(2) User anonymity: A mobile user's real identity and location cannot be traced by a foreign agent or any adversary. In this paper, we show that Yoon-Yoo-Ha's scheme has three disadvantages as follows.
(1) It cannot protect against an insider attack.
(2) Unfairness in session key computation.
(3) Attacks against the user anonymity.
We will point out these three disadvantages more clearly in Section 3. In order to overcome the above three disadvantages, we would like to propose a more secure scheme that also achieves user anonymity and resistance to security attacks. Furthermore, our scheme is more efficient regarding performance by using lightweight Elliptic Curve DiffieHellman (ECDH) computation compared with Yoon et al.'s scheme which uses heavyweight asymmetric cryptosystem with certificates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the scheme [17] , whose weaknesses are shown in Section 3. We then propose a new authentication scheme with roaming service and user anonymity in Section 4, whose security and performance are analyzed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
A Review of Yoon et al.'s authentication scheme
In this section, we review Yoon et al.'s ECCbased authentication scheme [17] . Their scheme consists of three phases, namely: registration, authentication and roaming phase. For convenience of description, we will list the common notations used throughout this paper in Table 1 .
Registration Phase
In this phase, all the communications between the mobile user MU and the home agent HA are through a secure channel. N A strong secret key of HA TA The current timestamp generated by an entity A CertA The certificate of an entity A (X)K Encryption of a message X using a symmetric key K based on AES [2] (PA, SA) The asymmetric public key and private key pair of an entity A based on ECC [4] EP A (X) Encryption of a message X using a public key of an entity A SS A (X) Signature on a message X using a private key of an entity A ⊕ The bitwise exclusive-or operation H(·) A collision free one-way hash function such as SHA-256 [15] || String concatenation 
Roaming Phase
When MU visits F A at the ith session, MU sends the following message to F A. 
Weaknesses of Yoon et al.'s authentication scheme
In this section, we demonstrate that Yoon et al.'s authentication scheme exposes the mobile user and remote agent to the risk of insider attack and is failing to achieve user anonymity. We explain as follows: 
Unfairness in Session Key Computation
Given two entities MU and F A, the computed session key sk must contain some contribution from each involved entity and no-one can control the session key from the connection single-handed. Unfortunately, we observe that Yoon et al.'s scheme is unfair for computing a session key and it can unilaterally be determined by MU. In Step (1) of the authentication phase, MU can always choose x and x 0 and compute L, where L is computed by MU alone and x and x 0 are two random numbers generated by MU alone, such that in Step (4) of the authentication phase, the session key computed by F A ac- Suppose there is an authentication request message transmitted between some mobile user MU and foreign agent F A containing (e, ID HA ). This means that these two entities are involved in an authentication phase and the attacker can discover the relation of a connection between MU, F A and HA. In this way, the attacker can discover other complete connection information between involved entities from MU to F A.
The Proposed Scheme
To remedy the weaknesses mentioned in Section 3, we propose a more secure and efficient authentication scheme based on elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Our scheme consists of four phases, namely: initialization, registration, authentication and roaming phase. The detail phases of our proposed scheme are shown in the following.
Initialization Phase
Before the system begins, the home agent HA selects two large prime numbers p and n and an elliptic curve equation E p over a finite field p : y 2 = x 3 + ax + b mod p, where p > 2 160 , n > 2 160 , a and b are two integer elements and 4a 3 + 27b 2 mod p = 0. HA also chooses an elliptic curve equation E and a base point P with the order n over E. In addition, HA selects its secret key N and computes P HA = NP . Finally, HA keeps N in private, publishes (E p , E, n, P, P HA , H(·)) and agrees a preshared symmetric key SK HF between HA and F A. Figure 2 shows the authentication phase of our proposed scheme. The detailed steps are described as follows.
Registration

Authentication Phase
When MU visits a new foreign network, MU inserts smart card into card reader and enters ID MU and P W MU . Then smart card chooses a random number x and computes X = xP , 
Roaming Phase
Security and Performance Analyses
This section shows the performance comparisons of our scheme and Yoon et al.'s scheme in case of the authentication phase and demonstrates that the propose scheme can prevent weaknesses in Yoon et al.'s scheme. To prove the security of our scheme, we present two important mathematical problems on elliptic curves. Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem: Given P, aP ∈ G, it is hard to find a.
Elliptic Curve Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem:
Given P, aP, bP ∈ G, it is hard to compute abP ∈ G.
Insider Attack Resistance
Assume that a privileged insider MA has the knowledge of a legitimate user's (MU) authentication key z = H( ID MU ||N ) ⊕ H(P W MU ⊕ rn) and tries to login for obtaining a roaming service. However, MA cannot pass the verification of Z = z ⊕ H(P W MU ⊕ rn) because MA does not know MU's password P W MU and random number rn which MU stores in the smart card after MU has received and verified his/her smart card. Thus, our scheme prevents insider attack.
Fairness in Session Key Computation
As shown in the authentication phase, MU randomly selects his/her contribution X = xP and sends a login request to F A. On receiving the login request message from MU, F A chooses its contribution Y = yP and sends a message to HA. On receiving the message from F A, HA must make sure that MU is a legal user and F A is a legal foreign agent. If so, HA sends two confirm messages to F A and MU. F A and MU got message of MAC HA and c 2 , respectively. Finally, the session key sk = xY = xyP = sk contains equal contributions from MU and F A, and thus is a fair key agreement scheme.
Provision of User Anonymity
An anonymity feature of users is that foreign agents or any adversary cannot find out anything about a mobile user from a message which is transferred with or without the identity, except home agent can verify it. In the proposed scheme, the encrypted value IN D = ID MU ⊕H(X 1 ||T MU ) is used instead of ID MU to guarantee the user anonymity. Since ID MU is never transmitted as plaintext over wireless communications, so except the home agent of MU, foreign agents or anyone else cannot find the real identity ID MU of MU without knowing the encrypted key H(X 1 ||T MU ).
Furthermore, because x was randomly chosen and integrated into login request message (X, IN D, c 1 ), there is no relationship between the previous x and the current x of an MU. Therefore, F A or anyone else cannot trace an MU and the feature of user anonymity is fully protected in our proposed scheme.
Performance Analyses and Functionality Comparisons
For performance analysis, we compare the computational primitives involved in authentication phase of our scheme and Yoon et al.'s, and tabulate the results in Table 2 . The heavyweight computations are executing asymmetric encryption/decryption, signature generation/verification, and multiplication operation of point. Our scheme needs only two more multiplication operations of point, two less hash operations and two less symmetric computations than Yoon et al.'s scheme. Moreover, the proposed scheme does not require any asymmetric computations to prevent insider attacks and provide user anonymity. Therefore, Note: "Pre" denotes pre-computed operation; "N/A" denotes not used by the scheme. Table 3 shows the functionality comparison between the proposed scheme and others [16, 17] . Wu et al.'s and Yoon et al.'s schemes do not provide user anonymity, insecure to insider attacks and are unfairness in session key establishment. Moreover, Wu et al.'s scheme lacks forgery attacks resistance and user friendliness due to the fact that the password is not chosen by the user freely. However, as shown in Table 3, the proposed scheme not only provides user anonymity and some functionality requirements but also resists all security attacks. From the above descriptions, it demonstrates that our scheme has many excellent features and is more efficient than other related schemes.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed Yoon et al.'s ECC-based authentication scheme for mobile communication systems. We have shown that their scheme is vulnerable to insider attack, unfairness in session key computation and is unable to provide user anonymity. To provide secure roaming service in mo-8 C. T. Li bile communication environments, we propose an improved scheme with user anonymity and demonstrate that our scheme is more secure and efficient, as compared with Yoon et al.'s authentication scheme. Therefore, it is practicable to use our scheme for seamless roaming over wireless communication networks.
